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INCOMPLETE PROTECTION: 
EXONERATION CLAUSES IN NEW YORK TRUSTS 
AND POWERS OF ATTORNEY 
Ilene S. Cooper
*
 and Robert M. Harper
**
 
Exoneration clauses excuse fiduciaries, most notably execu-
tors and trustees, from liability for the failure to exercise reasonable 
care.1  Although exoneration clauses in testamentary instruments 
have been deemed void as against public policy, pursuant to New 
York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (“EPTL”) section 11-1.17, 
there is no analogous statutory prohibition concerning the enforcea-
bility of similar provisions in inter vivos trusts and powers of attor-
ney.  The absence of such statutory guidance has left courts to reach 
divergent views concerning the enforceability of exoneration clauses 
in lifetime trust instruments.  In order to create uniformity in terms of 
the duties that fiduciaries (whether they be executors, trustees of tes-
tamentary trusts, trustees of inter vivos trusts, or attorneys-in-fact) 
owe to the individuals whose interests they protect, the EPTL and the 
New York General Obligations Law (“GOL”) should be amended to 
provide that exoneration clauses in inter vivos trust instruments and 
powers of attorney are void as against public policy. 
 
* Ilene S. Cooper (icooper@farrellfritz.com) is a partner at the law firm of Farrell Fritz, P.C.  
She concentrates her practice in the field of Trusts and Estates litigation.  Ms. Cooper is the 
Chair of the New York State Bar Association‟s Trusts and Estates Law Section, a past presi-
dent of the Suffolk County Bar Association, an Adjunct Professor at Touro Law Center, and 
a Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. 
**
 Robert M. Harper (rharper@farrellfritz.com) is an associate at Farrell Fritz, P.C., concen-
trating in the field of Trusts and Estates litigation.  Mr. Harper is a Special Professor of Law 
at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, a Vice-Chair of the Govern-
mental Relations and Legislation Committee of the New York State Bar Association‟s Trusts 
and Estates Law Section, and a Co-Chair of the Suffolk County Bar Association‟s Member 
Benefits Committee. 
1 Cf. Margaret Valentine Turano, Commentary: N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-
1.7 (2008) (discussing exoneration clauses). 
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I. HISTORY OF EPTL SECTION 11-1.7 
Estate and trust fiduciaries owe a duty of undivided, absolute 
loyalty to the beneficiaries whose interests they protect.2  This “in-
flexible” duty of fidelity is akin to the highest standards of honor, not 
just honesty alone.3  It obligates fiduciaries to administer the estate or 
trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries, with undivided loyalty and 
without regard to self-interest.4  The legal responsibilities arising 
from that fiduciary status cannot generally be divested by agreement 
or other means.5 
Despite that duty, however, testators and grantors have at-
tempted to insulate fiduciaries from liability for breaching their obli-
gations.6  These attempts come in the form of exoneration clauses, 
which purport to exculpate fiduciaries for breaching the duty of undi-
vided loyalty and failing to account.7  Yet, these provisions are not 
universally enforceable in New York. 
More than a century ago, in Crabb v. Young,8 the New York 
Court of Appeals first addressed the issue of whether exoneration 
clauses are enforceable.9  In Crabb, the decedent‟s will exempted the 
trustees of a testamentary trust from liability for “any loss or damage 
. . . except [that which occurred due to] their own willful default, 
misconduct or neglect.”10  When the trust suffered investment losses, 
the beneficiaries sought to be reimbursed by the trustee.11  Although 
both the trial court and intermediate appellate court ruled that the 
trustee had an obligation to replace the amount lost, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed, relying upon the exoneration clause contained in the 
 
2 Boles v. Lanham, 865 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App. Div. 2008); 41 N.Y. Jur. 2d Decedents‟ 
Estates § 1450 (2009); Ian W. MacLean, Exculpatory Clauses in Inter Vivos Trusts: What 
Remains of a Trustee’s Duty of Undivided Loyalty?, 37 NYSBA TRUSTS & ESTATES L. 
SECTION NEWSL. 5, 5 (Fall 2004). 
3 In re Wallens, 877 N.E.2d 960, 962 (N.Y. 2007). 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 MacLean, supra note 2. 
7 Robert Whitman, Exoneration Clauses in Wills and Trust Instruments, 4 HOFSTRA PROP. 
L.J. 123, 124-25 (1992). 
8 92 N.Y. 56 (1883). 
9 Id. at 65, 66. 
10 See id. at 66. 
11 See id. at 65. 
2
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will.12  In doing so, the Court explained that the decedent “had an ab-
solute right to select the agencies by which his bounty should be dis-
tributed and to impose the terms and conditions under which it should 
be done.”13  Since there was no evidence of willful default, miscon-
duct, or negligence on the trustee‟s part, the exoneration clause re-
quired that the fiduciary be excused from liability for the losses.14 
Subject to the requirement that fiduciaries act honestly and in 
good faith, the rule in Crabb prevailed in New York for more than 
five decades, until the Great Depression,15 when the State Legislature 
enacted Decedent Estate Law (“DEL”) section 125 in 1936.16  DEL 
section 125 proscribed the enforcement of exoneration clauses that 
purported to excuse estate and testamentary trust fiduciaries from lia-
bility for failing to exercise reasonable care.17  In passing DEL sec-
tion 125, the Legislature restricted the freedom of testation, which is 
strongly favored as a matter of public policy.18 
DEL section 125 was necessitated by the “increasing practice 
of testamentary draftsmen and corporate fiduciaries in vesting in . . . 
fiduciaries almost unlimited powers, with a minimum of obligations   
. . . .”19  As the legislative history reflects, this practice was “a serious 
potential menace . . . to the rights of . . . all persons interested in es-
tates.”20  Additionally, “[t]he primary duties of ordinary care, dili-
gence and prudence and of absolute impartiality among . . . beneficia-
ries [were] of the very essence of a trust, and any impairment of these 
or similar obligations of a fiduciary [was found to be] contrary to 
public policy.”21 
The same policy-based reasons governed thirty years later, 
when the Legislature enacted DEL section 125‟s successor, EPTL 
section 11-1.7.22  Under EPTL section 11-1.7, a testator is prohibited 
 
12 Id. at 65-66. 
13 Crabb, 92 N.Y. at 65. 
14 Id. at 65-66. 
15 See Henry A. Shinn, Exoneration Clauses in Trust Instruments, 42 YALE L.J. 359, 359-
60 (1933) (discussing the rapid depreciation of trust assets). 
16 See, e.g., In re Clark‟s Will, 177 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1931); In re Balfe‟s Will, 280 
N.Y.S. 128, 130-31 (App. Div. 1935); Turano, supra note 1. 
17 In re Stralem, 695 N.Y.S.2d 274, 278 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cnty. 1999). 
18 Turano, supra note 1. 
19 Stralem, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 278. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
3
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from exculpating the executor or testamentary trustee nominated in a 
will from liability for failing to “exercise reasonable care, diligence 
and prudence.”23  Will provisions that purport to do so are void as 
against public policy and have no import.24  Indeed, as explained in 
Estate of Stralem,25 “the attempted exoneration of the fiduciary [of an 
estate or testamentary trust] for any loss, unless occasioned by „will-
ful neglect or misconduct‟ is a nugatory provision amounting to noth-
ing more than a waste of good white paper.”26 
Examples of cases in which courts have reached the same 
conclusion that the court did in Stralem abound.27  In Estate of Lu-
bin,28 the decedent‟s will provided that the executor of his estate 
would be relieved of liability “for any loss or injury to the property    
. . . except . . . as may result from fraud, misconduct or gross negli-
gence.”29  Describing that provision as a “toothless tiger,” the court 
held that it was unenforceable as against public policy.30 
Another noteworthy case is Will of Allister,31 in which the de-
cedent‟s will authorized her testamentary trustee to invest the trust 
principal “irrespective of whether the same may be authorized by the 
laws of [this] State . . . as investments for fiduciaries and without the 
duty to diversify and without any restrictions placed upon fiduciaries 
by any present or future applicable law.”32  However, the court found 
that the exoneration provision contravened EPTL section 11-1.7, rea-
soning that the provision “would elevate the fiduciary above the 
law,” if effectuated.33 
Although EPTL section 11-1.7 unquestionably applies to tes-
tamentary instruments, the statute is silent with respect to inter vivos 
 
23 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.7(a)(1). 
24 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.7(a)(b). 
25 695 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cnty. 1999). 
26 Id. at 278 (quoting In re Curley‟s Will, 272 N.Y.S. 489, 501 (Sur. Ct., Kings Cnty. 
1934)) modified, 280 N.Y.S. 80 (App. Div. 1935). 
27 See In re Lang‟s Will, 302 N.Y.S.2d 954, 957 (Sur. Ct., Erie Cnty. 1969); Matter of 
Egerer, No. 1281 P 2002, 2006 WL 6670806, at *4 (Sur. Ct., Suffolk Cnty. Feb. 2, 2006) 
(finding portions of the will void). 
28 539 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sur. Ct., Bronx Cnty. 1989). 
29 Id. at 696. 
30 Id. 
31 545 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cnty. 1989). 
32 Id. at 486. 
33 Id. 
4
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trust instruments.34  That silence has left New York courts to reach 
their own, sometimes divergent, views on the issue, and necessitates 
amendments to EPTL section 11-1.7 to provide that the statute ap-
plies to exoneration clauses in inter vivos trust instruments. 
II. EXONERATION CLAUSES IN INTER VIVOS TRUST 
INSTRUMENTS 
As EPTL section 11-1.7 does not address inter vivos trusts, 
the issue of the enforceability of exoneration clauses in such instru-
ments has been left to the discretion of the New York courts.35  In ex-
ercising their discretion, however, the courts have reached conflicting 
conclusions as to the applicability of EPTL section 11-1.7 to inter vi-
vos trust instruments and the enforceability of the exculpatory provi-
sions contained in them.36 
Absent statutory guidance declaring exoneration clauses in in-
ter vivos trust instruments void as against public policy, most New 
York courts have, historically speaking, enforced them, applying “[a] 
more liberal rule” to such provisions than to exculpatory clauses in 
testamentary instruments.37  “The rationale for this difference . . . is 
said to be the nature of an inter vivos transaction and the contracting 
freedom of the [grantor] and trustee to define the scope of the latter‟s 
powers and liabilities.”38 
Notwithstanding a grantor‟s freedom to contract as he or she 
wishes, several courts have found that EPTL section 11-1.7 governs 
in cases involving inter vivos trusts.39  Indeed, even the courts that 
 
34 See In re Shore, 854 N.Y.S.2d 293, 295-96 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2008); In re Francis, 
853 N.Y.S.2d 245, 250 (Sur. Ct., Westchester Cnty. 2008). 
35 See Turano, supra note 1. 
36 Compare In re Mednick, 587 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128-29 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 1992) (con-
cluding that “the limitations on the powers and immunities of testamentary trustees under 
EPTL 11-1.7 do not apply to inter vivos trustees”), with Shore, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 296 (stating 
that the “public policy against exonerating testamentary fiduciaries from any and all accoun-
tability is equally applicable with respect to inter vivos trusts where . . . there is no one in a 
position to protect the beneficiaries‟ interests during the existence of the trust”). 
37 In re Mankin, No. 330328, 2010 WL 2801614, at *3-4 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cnty. May 26, 
2010), aff’d, 930 N.Y.S.2d 79 (App. Div. 2011). 
38 Id. 
39 In re Goldblatt, 618 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cnty. 1994) (observing that in 
the context of an SCPA Article 17-A guardianship proceeding, an exoneration clause con-
tained in a proposed supplemental needs trust violated public policy); Shore, 854 N.Y.S.2d 
at 296 (finding that “the public policy in EPTL 11-1.7 against exonerating a fiduciary from 
5
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have applied a more liberal standard to exoneration clauses in inter 
vivos trust instruments have held that there are “limitations to the en-
forceability of such clauses.”40 
It is beyond dispute that the “trustee of a lifetime trust who is 
guilty of wrongful negligence, impermissible self-dealing, bad faith 
or reckless indifference to the interests of beneficiaries will not be 
shielded from liability by an exoneration clause.”41  Nor will the 
courts enforce exculpatory provisions that seek to render a trustee 
completely unaccountable;42 to excuse the fiduciary of an inter vivos 
trust from the duty to account;43 or to absolve an attorney-fiduciary 
who drafted the trust instrument of liability for all conduct other than 
acts committed in bad faith.44  Even under the more liberal standard 
discussed above, the beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust are entitled 
to some level of protection, as loyalty, accountability and reasonable-
ness are hallmarks of a trustee‟s fiduciary relationship.45 
Additionally, case law suggests that an exoneration clause 
contained in an inter vivos trust instrument is not enforceable when 
the fiduciary is involved, either directly or indirectly, in drafting or 
creating it.46  The court recognized as much in In re Shore,47 where it 
 
liability for the failure to exercise reasonable care, diligence and prudence applies equally to 
inter vivos trust where by its terms there is no one in a position to protect the beneficiaries 
from the actions of the trustee”). 
40 In re Tydings, No. 2008-2623, 2011 WL 2556955, at *6 (Sur. Ct., Bronx Cnty. June 28, 
2011); see also O‟Hayer v. de St. Aubin, 293 N.Y.S.2d 147, 152-53 (App. Div. 1968) (ad-
dressing the application of an exoneration clause in an inter vivos trust instrument to ac-
knowledge its effect in limiting, but not precluding, liability imposed upon a trustee); In re 
Cowles, 255 N.Y.S.2d 160, 173-74 (App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 215 N.E.2d 509 (N.Y. 1966) 
(construing the express terms of the exculpatory clause as “relieving the trustee from any 
responsibility for the loss resulting”). 
41 Tydings, 2011 WL 2556955, at *6; see also Boles, 865 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (opining that a 
“trustee is liable if he or she commits a breach of trust in bad faith, intentionally, or with 
reckless indifference to the interests of the beneficiaries”). 
42 In re Rivas, No. 2000 LT 00007/B, slip op. at *4 (Sur. Ct., Monroe Cnty. Jan. 5, 2011). 
43 See, e.g., Shore, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 295 (“[A]ccountability is an essential element of all 
fiduciary relationships which cannot be waived.”); Stansbury v. Stansbury, 2007 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 4505, at *7 (Sur. Ct., Kings Cnty. May 21, 2007) (noting that an exoneration from 
such an accounting would stand in opposition to public policy). 
44 Tydings, 2011 WL 2556955, at *6. 
45 See Shore, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 296. 
46 Cf. Tydings, 2011 WL 2556955, at *6, stating: 
Nonetheless, it is clear that where, as here, a trustee was neither directly 
nor indirectly involved in drafting or creating the trust, and may be pre-
sumed to have relied upon the explicit provisions of an exoneration 
clause contained in a lifetime trust instrument before agreeing to serve as 
6
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found that an exculpatory clause contained in an inter vivos trust 
drafted by the trustee was void and unenforceable.48 
In the absence of statutory guidance, the issue of the enfor-
ceability of exoneration clauses in inter vivos trust instruments in 
New York has been left to the discretion of the courts and resulted in 
what appear to be decisional inconsistencies.  The inconsistencies, 
when taken in conjunction with the public policies discussed below, 
warrant legislative action, declaring broad exculpatory clauses in in-
ter vivos trust instruments exonerating fiduciaries from the duties of 
reasonable care, diligence, and prudence void as against public poli-
cy. 
III. ADDITIONAL POLICY-BASED REASONS TO AMEND EPTL 
SECTION 11-1.7 
While the freedom of contract, much like the freedom of tes-
tation, generally is favored,49 it is not so sacred as to render enforcea-
ble a contract provision that contravenes public policy.50  It has been 
restricted on public policy grounds in several contexts, including dis-
putes concerning attorneys‟ fees;51 collective bargaining conflicts in-
volving public employees;52 and cases concerning contractual provi-
sions exonerating caterers from liability for damages resulting from 
the caterer‟s negligence.53  Moreover, as the law is anything but stat-
 
fiduciary, generally the trustee will not be held liable for acts specified in 
the exoneration clause. 
Id. 
47 854 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2008). 
48 Id. at 296. 
49 Bajan Grp., Inc. v. Consumers Interstate Corp., No. 1099-07, slip op. at *8 (Sup. Ct., 
Albany Cnty. 2010) (“After all, even in commercial contracts between sophisticated business 
entities, a covenant against competition is subject to a rule of reason that requires courts to 
balance the competing public policies in favor of robust competition and freedom of con-
tract.”). 
50 Lustig v. Congregation B‟Nai Israel of Midwood, 319 N.Y.S.2d 994, 1000 (Sup. Ct., 
Kings Cnty. 1971); see also Brown v. Sup. Ct., 68 N.E. 145, 146 (N.Y. 1903) (opining that 
despite “the general rule that the law permits great freedom of action in making contracts, 
there are some restrictions placed upon that right by legislation by public policy and by the 
nature of things”). 
51 Samuel v. Druckman & Sinel, LLP, 855 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (App. Div. 2008). 
52 Niagara Wheatfield Admins. Ass‟n v. Niagara Wheatfield Cen. Sch. Dist., 375 N.E.2d 
37, 39 (N.Y. 1978). 
53 Lustig, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 996. 
7
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ic, the courts have recognized that contract provisions which were 
“valid in one era may be wholly opposed to the public policy of 
another.”54 
In the trusts and estates context, the freedom of testation—
which, much like the freedom of contract, is strongly favored—has 
already been restricted, yielding to public policy concerns that execu-
tors and trustees under testamentary instruments not be absolved of 
the duty of reasonable care.55  There exists no public policy-based 
justification for differentiating between the standards of care owed by 
fiduciaries acting under testamentary and inter vivos trust instru-
ments.  On the contrary, public policy requires that fiduciaries acting 
pursuant to testamentary and inter vivos trust instruments alike ad-
here to the standards of reasonable care, diligence, and prudence,56 as 
they are, unquestionably, bound by the same duty of undivided loyal-
ty.57 
This is especially true in the case of a revocable trust.  As a 
revocable trust is a substitute for a will,58 a fiduciary acting under a 
revocable trust should be bound to the same duty of reasonable care, 
 
54 See id. at 996. 
55 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.7. 
56 Hon. C. Raymond Radigan, “New Uniform Trust Code to be Submitted to Legislature”, 
N.Y.L.J., available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202537636765&New_Uniform_Trust_Code_to_Be_Submitted_to_Legislature (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2012) (proposing legislation which would unify testamentary and inter vivos trusts 
under the same standards). 
57 Boles, 865 N.Y.S.2d at 361; see also In re Quatela, No. 355511, 2010 WL 4466757 
(Sur. Ct., Nassau Cnty. Sept. 30, 2010) (citations omitted) (pincite unavailable) (“A trustee is 
duty-bound to act in good faith in the administration of a trust, with honesty and undivided 
loyalty to the beneficiaries and avoid any circumstances whereby the trustee‟s personal in-
terest will come in conflict with the interest of the beneficiaries.  The purpose of this rule is 
to ensure that the trustee‟s acts are above suspicion and that the trust receives the trustee‟s 
uninfluenced judgment.”). 
58 In re Tisdale, 655 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 1997); see also In re Goetz, 
793 N.Y.S.2d 318, 322 (Sur. Ct., Westchester Cnty. 2005) (citations omitted) (“Further, re-
vocable inter vivos trusts are commonly employed as estate planning tools and are coordi-
nated with the grantor‟s will, functioning in much the same manner as a will.  Because the 
Goetz revocable trust was created as a part of the decedent‟s overall estate planning at the 
same time as his will, the trust can be deemed to „function[s] as a will since it is an ambula-
tory instrument that speaks at death to determine the disposition of the settlor‟s property.‟ ” 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added)); In re Davidson, 677 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (Sur. Ct., 
N.Y. Cnty. 1998) (noting that “revocable trusts—used increasingly as devices to avert will 
contests—function essentially as testamentary instruments (i.e., they are ambulatory during 
the settlor‟s lifetime, speak at death to determine the disposition of the settlor‟s property, 
may be amended or revoked without court intervention and are unilateral in nature) and 
therefore must be treated as the equivalents of wills in the eyes of the law”). 
8
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diligence and prudence that is imposed upon an executor or testamen-
tary trustee. 
Based upon the foregoing, EPTL section 11-1.7 should be 
amended to reflect that inter vivos trustees are subject to its provi-
sions.  Doing so will further the public interest of ensuring that fidu-
ciaries acting under lifetime trusts exercise reasonable care, diligence, 
and prudence in connection with their fiduciary duties. 
IV. EXONERATION CLAUSES IN POWERS OF ATTORNEY 
By executing a power of attorney, a principal can appoint an 
attorney-in-fact to act on his or her behalf as to the powers granted in 
the governing instrument,59 including the authority to engage in real-
estate transactions, banking transactions, and estate-related transac-
tions, among others.60  “A durable power of attorney authorizes the 
[attorney-in-fact] to exercise powers despite the incompetence or dis-
ability of the principal and is effective until the principal‟s death un-
less the instrument expressly provides that the power is terminated by 
the incapacity of the principal . . . .”61 
As the relationship of an attorney-in-fact to the principal is 
that of an agent and principal, the relationship carries with it the duty 
to act prudently.62  The relationship also imposes upon an attorney-in-
fact the duty to act on the principal‟s behalf, with undivided loyalty, 
independent of the attorney-in-fact‟s self-interest.63  Indeed, an attor-
ney-in-fact must “act in accordance with the highest principles of mo-
rality, fidelity, loyalty and fair dealing.”64  Additionally, to the extent 
that a power of attorney authorizes an attorney-in-fact to make a gift 
on a principal‟s behalf, the attorney-in-fact must only exercise that 
 
59 In re Hoerter, No. 333127, slip op. at *6 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cnty. 2007). 
60 Hon. C. Raymond Radigan, LexisNexis Practice Insights: “Formal Requirements for 
General Powers of Attorney” (last viewed on Mar. 18, 2012) (on file with the authors). 
61 See id. 
62 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1505(1) (“In dealing with property of the principal, an agent 
shall observe the standard of care that would be observed by a prudent person dealing with 
property of another.”). 
63 In re Ferrara, 852 N.E.2d 138, 144 (N.Y. 2006) (quotations omitted); see also Weber v. 
Burman, No. 20875/06, slip op. at *6 (Sur. Ct., Nassau Cnty. 2008) (citation omitted) (reite-
rating that an attorney-in-fact must “act in the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty to-
ward [the principal] and must act in accordance with the highest principles of morality, fidel-
ity, loyalty and fair dealing”). 
64 Ferrara, 852 N.E.2d at 144. 
9
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discretion when the gift is in the principal‟s best interests.65 
Consistent with those fiduciary obligations, in In re Estate of 
Francis,66 the only reported New York case addressing whether an 
exoneration clause in a power of attorney is enforceable, the court 
found that a broad exculpatory provision in a power of attorney vi-
olated public policy.67  There, the decedent‟s attorney-in-fact “admit-
ted that he transferred to himself or his mother virtually all of [the] 
decedent‟s liquid assets and secured a life tenancy in the [decedent‟s] 
real property.”68  The attorney-in-fact also “used [the] decedent‟s as-
sets to pay off his personal credit card debts, to purchase a computer, 
clothes, CDs, DVDs, whiskey and fund his Pay Pal accounts.”69 
When the decedent died and the fiduciary of his estate com-
menced a turnover proceeding against the attorney-in-fact, the attor-
ney-in-fact endeavored to shield himself from liability for his mis-
conduct.70  The attorney-in-fact did so based upon an exoneration 
clause that the decedent included in the power of attorney, which 
purported to excuse the attorney-in-fact from liability for any and all 
actions taken under the power of attorney.71  However, the court re-
jected the attorney-in-fact‟s efforts, noting that “a clause which seeks 
to exonerate an attorney-in-fact from any and all liability runs afoul 
of the spirit of New York‟s public policy . . . . ”72  As a result, the 
court set aside the transfers made by the attorney-in-fact and directed 
him to account.73 
Considering the fiduciary duties of an attorney-in-fact to act 
reasonably, with undivided loyalty, and independent of any self-
 
65 Id. at 139 (“[P]ower of attorney that contains additional language augmenting the gift-
giving authority must make gifts pursuant to those enhanced powers in the principal‟s best 
interest”).  “[A]bsent a specific provision in the power of attorney document authorizing 
gifts, an attorney-in-fact, in exercising his or her fiduciary responsibilities to the principal, 
may not make a gift to himself [or herself] or a third party of the money or property which is 
the subject of the agency relationship.”  In re Curtis, 923 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (App. Div. 
2011) (alteration in original).  “Such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and 
self-dealing, a presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing of intent 
on the part of the principal to make the gift.”  Id. 
66 853 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sur. Ct., Westchester Cnty. 2008). 
67 Id. at 250-51. 
68 Id. at 249. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 247-48. 
71 Francis, 853 N.Y.S.2d at 247-48. 
72 Id. at 250 
73 Id. at 251. 
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interest, it logically follows that an exoneration clauses purporting to 
excuse an attorney-in-fact for failing to honor those duties violates 
public policy.  For the reasons discussed more fully below, the GOL 
should be amended to so provide. 
V. REASONS TO AMEND THE GOL 
While the freedom of a principal to appoint an individual of 
his or her choice to exercise certain powers on the principal‟s behalf 
is entitled to great respect, it is not absolute.  Public policy dictates 
that an attorney-in-fact act reasonably in connection with the princip-
al, and an exoneration clause exculpating an attorney-in-fact from the 
failure to honor the duty of reasonable care should, therefore, be 
deemed unenforceable. 
The potential for the financial exploitation of a principal at the 
hands of an attorney-in-fact has proven itself to be too great to excuse 
an attorney-in-fact from the duty of reasonable care.74  This is espe-
cially true, when taken in conjunction with the fact that, in cases con-
cerning durable powers of attorney, the powers survive even the prin-
cipal‟s incapacity or disability, potentially leaving the principal 
unprotected against an attorney-in-fact‟s exploitation until the prin-
cipal‟s death. 
Consequently, in order to ensure that an attorney-in-fact acts 
reasonably with respect to his or her principal, the GOL should be 
amended to provide that an exoneration clause in a power of attorney 
that seeks to absolve an attorney-in-fact from liability for failing to 
exercise reasonable care is void and unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since executors, testamentary trustees, inter vivos trustees, 
and attorneys-in-fact are held to the same standard of absolute, undi-
vided loyalty to the beneficiaries whom they serve, public policy ne-
cessitates that they be treated similarly, especially in the context of 
exoneration clauses.  The New York EPTL and GOL should be 
amended to effectuate that purpose by filling the statutory silence 
 
74 See N.Y. St. Law Revision Comm., “Report on Proposed Revisions to the General Ob-
ligations Law in Relation to Powers of Attorney” (2003). 
11
Cooper and Harper: Incomplete Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
390 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
with respect to inter vivos trust instruments and powers of attorney, 
regardless of a grantor or principal‟s expressed intentions.  Doing so 
will ensure that New York‟s public policy concerns regarding rea-
sonable fiduciary conduct are served and that the courts address these 
issues uniformly. 
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